Infallibilism

Infallibilism is, in epistemology, the position that knowledge is, by definition, a true belief which cannot be rationally doubted. Other beliefs may be rationally justified, but they do not rise to the level of knowledge unless absolutely certain. Infallibilism's opposite, fallibilism, is the position that a justified true belief may be considered knowledge, even if we can rationally doubt it. Fallibilism is endorsed by virtually all contemporary epistemologists. Fallibilism is not to be confused with skepticism, which is the belief that knowledge is unattainable for rational human beings. René Descartes, an early proponent of infallibilism argued, “my reason convinces me that I ought not the less carefully to withhold belief from what is not entirely certain and indubitable, than from what is manifestly false” Infallibilism can be expressed in logic as 'if I know that p, then I can’t be mistaken about p’ A case against Infallibilism can be made by Howard-Snyder, et.al.’s (2003) zebra case: