胆小鬼博弈（英文：The game of chicken），又译懦夫博弈，是博弈论中一个影响深远的模型。模型中，两名车手相对驱车而行，谁最先转弯的一方被耻笑为「胆小鬼」（chicken），让另一方胜出，因此这博弈模型在英文中称为The Game of Chicken(懦夫游戏），但如果两人拒绝转弯，任由两车相撞，最终谁都无法受益。这套模型在政治、经济上经常使用，也被用来形容相互保证毁灭的核战争，其中1962年古巴导弹危机常列入胆小鬼博弈的典型例子。

The game of chicken, also known as the hawk-dove game or snowdrift game, is an influential model of conflict for two players in game theory. The principle of the game is that while each player prefers not to yield to the other, the worst possible outcome occurs when both players do not yield.