Most important, America is reluctant to issue any SDRS at all, let alone $4trn-worth.

最重要的是，美国完全不愿发行SDRS，更别说价值4万亿美元的了。

When they face a liquidity crunch, they can offer cash-rich countries SDRS in exchange for hard currency.

当他们面临资金紧缩时，他们可以向现金充裕的国家提供SDRS，以换取硬通货。

But when SDRS are issued, everyone gets reserves without having to provide anything in return.

但当发行SDRS时，每个国家都可以获得储备，而无需提供任何回报。

However, SDRS do not have to be used to be useful. Their very presence on balance-sheets frees up dollars.

但SDRS不一定要被用来发挥什么作用。它们在资产负债表上的存在放开了美元。

At present, some 204bn SDRS sit on the balance-sheets of finance ministries and central banks around the world.

目前，全球各国财政部和央行的资产负债表上约有2040亿SDRS。

In the meantime, rich countries should lend their SDRs to countries that are short of reserves.

与此同时，富裕国家应该把它们的特别提款权借给那些外汇储备不足的国家。

Creating SDRs would provide indiscriminate, unconditional aid without draining the IMF's reserves.

创建特别提款权将在不会耗尽国际货币基金组织储备的情况下，提供无理由、无条件的援助。

Why shouldn't the IMF do the same for the world's governments? Some economists want a huge allocation of SDRS, worth $4trn.

为什么IMF不也为世界各国政府这么做呢？一些经济学家希望获得价值4万亿美元的SDRS。

Yet SDRS failed to take off. The need for them became less pressing after America untethered the dollar from gold in 1971.

但SDRS没能发展起来。1971年美国将美元与黄金脱钩后，对它们的需求就不那么迫切了。

Its opposition stems from a belief that the IMF should not be printing money (when converted, SDRS increase the amount of cash in circulation).

对该想法的反对源于这样一种信念，即IMF不应该印钞（当兑换时，SDRS会增加流通中的现金数量）。