As a general proposition, direct government in all its forms was bitterly opposed by men of a conservative cast of mind.

作为一个普遍的主张，所有形式的直接政府都遭到持保守思想的人的强烈反对。

Hence, although our general proposition is a priori, all its applications to actual particulars involve experience and therefore contain an empirical element.

因此，尽管我们的一般命题是先验的， 但它对实际细节的所有应用都涉及经验， 因此包含经验要素。

Yet the knowledge of such general propositions is quite vital to a great deal of what is generally admitted to be known.

然而，关于这些一般命题的知识对于许多被普遍承认为已知的东西来说是相当重要的。

This illustrates the difference between general propositions known a priori such as 'two and two are four', and empirical generalizations such as 'all men are mortal'.

这说明了先验已知的一般命题（例如“二和二等于四”）与经验概括（例如“所有人都会死”）之间的区别。

The other point is more interesting, and of more philosophical importance. It is, that we may sometimes know a general proposition in cases where we do not know a single instance of it.

另一点更有趣，也更具哲学意义。也就是说，有时我们可能知道一个一般命题，而我们不知道它的单个实例。

Thus the difference between an a priori general proposition and an empirical generalization does not come in the meaning of the proposition; it comes in the nature of the evidence for it.

因此，先验一般命题与经验概括之间的区别并不在于命题的意义； 它来自于它的证据的性质。

Thus our knowledge of the general propositions of mathematics (and the same applies to logic) must be accounted for otherwise than our (merely probable) knowledge of empirical generalizations such as 'all men are mortal'.

因此，我们对数学一般命题的知识（这同样适用于逻辑）必须以其他方式来解释，而不是我们对经验概括的（仅仅是可能的）知识，例如“所有人都会死”。

And more particularly, how can there be knowledge of general propositions in cases where we have not examined all the instances, and indeed never can examine them all, because their number is infinite?

更具体地说，在我们没有检查所有实例并且实际上永远无法检查所有实例（因为它们的数量是无限的）的情况下，怎么可能有关于一般命题的知识呢？