The case may be made clearer by considering a genuinely-empirical generalization, such as 'All men are mortal'.

通过考虑真正的经验概括，例如“所有人都会死”，情况可能会变得更清楚。

Also we can be forced to admit, on reflection, that there may be some doubt, however slight, as to whether all men are mortal.

此外，经过深思熟虑，我们可能不得不承认，对于是否所有人都会死，可能会有一些怀疑，无论多么轻微。

This illustrates the difference between general propositions known a priori such as 'two and two are four', and empirical generalizations such as 'all men are mortal'.

这说明了先验已知的一般命题（例如“二和二等于四”）与经验概括（例如“所有人都会死”）之间的区别。

We believe that all men are mortal because we know that there are innumerable instances of men dying, and no instances of their living beyond a certain age.

我们相信所有人都会死， 因为我们知道有无数的人会死去， 但没有人活到一定年龄。

If Socrates is one of these men, it is foolish to go the roundabout way through 'all men are mortal' to arrive at the conclusion that probably Socrates is mortal.

如果苏格拉底是这些人中的一员，那么通过“人都会死”的迂回方式得出苏格拉底可能会死的结论是愚蠢的。

Thus our knowledge of the general propositions of mathematics (and the same applies to logic) must be accounted for otherwise than our (merely probable) knowledge of empirical generalizations such as 'all men are mortal'.

因此，我们对数学一般命题的知识（这同样适用于逻辑）必须以其他方式来解释，而不是我们对经验概括的（仅仅是可能的）知识，例如“所有人都会死”。

But the newness of the knowledge is much less certain if we take the stock instance of deduction that is always given in books on logic, namely, 'All men are mortal; Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is mortal'.

但是，如果我们采用逻辑书籍中总是给出的演绎的股票实例，即“所有人都会死；”苏格拉底是人，所以苏格拉底会死。”

Hence we shall reach the conclusion that Socrates is mortal with a greater approach to certainty if we make our argument purely inductive than if we go by way of 'all men are mortal' and then use deduction.

因此，如果我们使我们的论证纯粹归纳，而不是通过“所有人都会死”然后使用演绎，我们将得出这样的结论，即苏格拉底会死，并且更接近确定性。